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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
OSBC)RXE .A.LLEX,
Plaintiff and R-espondent

vs.

Case No. 7672

ROSE P ~\Rl( PH~\R~IACY,
Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF APPEL·LANT

STATEME~T

,OF THE FACTS

The plaintiff, Os horne Allen, requested a declaratory judgment seeking to relieve himself from a negative covenant in his contract of employment with the
defendant and appellant, Rose Park Pharmacy. No
other part of the contract whereby he was hired as
a pharmacist and manager has been attacked but
only this single paragraph which reads:
8. Osborne agrees that in the event of terInination of this contract for any reason, he
shall fully account for all funds, inventory, as-
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sets and equipment and he shall not directly or
indirectly compete, as an employee or principal,
in the operation of a drug store or pharmacy
within a radius of two miles of this drug store
for ~a period of five years thereafter. Breach or
threatened breach of the terms of employment
shall entitle this Pharmacy to injunctive relief
in addition to other remedies.
After trial of the issues the District Court held,
''The Court is of the opinion in this matter the
parties dealt in good faith. The defendants, I feel,
had no intention of making use of any skill that the
plain tiff had and thereafter discharging him to his
disadvantage. However, if people enter into a contr.act
with good faith and good intentions, there isn't anything to prevent them from changing their minds
later and employing a relative, and I think these people saw those possibilities, ~and that is the reason they
had a contract permitting the termination of the contract on notice.
''I am of the op1n1on that the five years is a
modest arrangement, that in a business that is starting up five years is usually necessary for protection,
but the Court is of the opinion that the area is too
broad, that from the pharmacy to the southwest involves such ~a heavily populated area that it is an
undue restriction and constitutes a restraint of trade.
The Court is further of the opinion that there is no
mutuality in this contl}act, that it is· a restraint of
trade, for an employer to he able to employ a man
and discharge him on a short notice ~and thereby

2
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re~trict

hin1 fron1 practicing his profession for a period
of ti1ne thereafter, beeau~l\ \vith a short time he would
not haYe acquired any secrets, he \Vouldn 't be ~able to
do then1 any da1nage by anything that he learned in
the establishment, and this contract has to he looked
at to be enforced under any condition that may arise
after it is signed. I am also of the opinion that there
is no proper consideration in the contract. For lack
of 1nutuality and lack of consideration, and because it
i~ in restraint of trade, the Court finds that Paragraph
8 of the contract, "-hich has reference to the competition that the plaintiff rnay give to the defendant, is
unenforceable." (R. 93-94)
Based upon this oral opinion the Court made and
entered Findings (R. 14) and a Judgment (R. 18)
declaring that the said negative covenant was invalid
and unenforceable.
The situation of the parties as of the time of
1naking the Contract of Employment in November of
1949 was as follo\\-s. The Geurts Brothers, Theodore
I., William T. and Heber J. had instituted a shopping
area at 4th North Street and Oakley Street in Salt
Lake City, Utah. This is in the extreme Northwest
portion of the populated area of the City (see Exhibit
A). They had built and were operating a grocery
store on the North side of the street and were in
the stage of cornpleting a drugstore building on the
other side of 4th North Street.
A corporation \\'as finally formed, Rose Park
Pharu1aty, uy these Geurts Brothers and their wive:;;,
3
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to operate the. drug store. Negotiations were had to
ascertain ··whether a lease, employment or other arrangenlent should be affected for operating the pharmacy.
The parties hereto entered into negotiations for
the employment of the plaintiff to operate appellant's
pharmacy as Inanager and pharmacist. The amount
of salary was agreed to (R. 77). The plaintiff insisted
upon being given ~a right to acquire an ownership
interest in the defendant corporation (25% ).

Q. Mr. Allen, would you have signed the
contract presented to you if it hadn't had the
provision for gaining an interest In the corporation~

A.

No, that wasMR. PuGSLEY : We object.
A. (Continuing)-the main purpose.
MR. PuGSLEY: We object as immaterial.
THB CouRT: Overruled. Y·ou may answer.
A. Those were my terms when I negotiated the contract. There are other figures. That
was my terms. I started out with 49 per cent.
working interest in the store. They readjusted
it to 25 percent. That was one of the qualifications, or I would never have gone into the
business.
Q. Why did you want to obt,ain a share
in the business~
A. Because I was going to make it my
life's work.
Q.. Would you have signed the contract if
you had known you were to be employed for
only one year~
MR. PuGSLEY: We object to that as linmaterial also.

4
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THE CouRT: Overruled.
.:\.. No, I \Youldn 't ha Ye signed it. I would
never havp left n1y other job.
)lR. RICHARDS: That is 'all.
CROSS-EX.A.~1:IN ATION
BY )lR. PUGSLEY :
Q. You read over the contract before you
8igned it, did you not 'l
. .\. Yes, I did.
Q. And you accepted the 30-days notice
and the pay for the 30 days, did you not~
A. Yes, I did.
~IR. PuGsLEY : That is all ( R. 92 and 93) .
...\ reading of the con tract, (Exhibit B) details the
tern1s of employn1ent, his bonus program to ~acquire
stock and notice before termination, all of which were
accepted and the benefits taken by plaintiff, except
that he no'v seeks to squirm out of the negative
covenant.
It is further pertinent that plaintiff lived in adjacent blocks in \Yh'at is known as the ''Rose P~ark''
area and knew the people therein. (R. 33). As stated
at the trial by nlr. William T. Geurts, one of appellant's officers:
Q. Will you state what your intention was
so far as the permanency of Mr. Allen's employment when you formed the contract~
A. Our intention was to employ a pharlnacist and manager to handle the full managen1ent and operation of the drug store, and when
we selected Mr. Osborne, our intention was just
that.
·
Q. Did you at that time believe that Mr.
Osborne \vould be satisfactory for that purpose~
A. 'V e had confidence he would be.
5
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Q. Did you have any discussion as to the
basis of the two-mile radius and the five-year
period that is set forth in the contract~
A. Yes, my other two brothers and I discussed that phase of the thing. In the first
place we knew that Mr. Osborne was residing
in the Rose Park area. We also knew that he
had at least made overtures to those people
who were intending to develop the shopping
center over in Rose Park, and we were not at
that time sure whether or not Mr. Allen would
want to remain with us. We were 'also not
certain that competitors might not want to take
away from us, Mr. Allen, and we felt it was
necessary to safe-guard ourselves, since we were
investing what we considered at least a considerable sum in the establishment of that business, and also in the initial stages of operations
at least investing what loss we might sustain
to develop good will. We wanted to protect
those investments (R. 74-75).
Q.. Now you testified as to some of your
reasons for including the two-mile radial area
in the contract. Will you state what the reasons
were for including the time of five years~
A. Well, the time of five years, our reasoning was along this line, that a firm does not
very readily build up good will. It is more or
less flexible and fluid, it passes over a short
period of time, whereas a longer period it becomes stable, and we, felt that a five-year period
would bridge us over any good will that might
attach to individual employees and would become
stable ·as the good will of the firm.
Q. Did you consider a two-mile radius of
the drug store would be a reasonable radius.
A. ~Oh, yes, I do, because there is this situation.· We are the most northwesterly drug store

6
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in tht:.' recently developed are'a of Salt Lake
City. r~ehe other drug stores rnainly are between
us and ttnvn, and, \vell, \Ye presumed that the
shopping habits of people rnight cause them to
stop either going to or corning from town, and
\Ye felt that \Ye should protect ourselves against
that contingency.
Q. Do you consider that the five-year period of time is a reason'able period~
. .\.. Yes, I think so. ( R. ·77 -78)
The drugstore \vas a new business in the area,
neYer opened before they hired plaintiff. As shown
by the rnap, Exhibit . .\.,
. it is the last such store in the
Xorth,vest section of Salt Lake City. Within the twoutile area there are eight drugstores as shown by the
rnap, Exhibit ~'I~'' but within the entire Salt L'ake
City area as sho\vn by the classified advertising in the
current telephone book (Exhbit No. 1) there are 90
drugstores .
. .\s
.
the drug store was established and started
business, the delivery of drugs constantly expanded.
The plaintiff testified that he had delivered in the
immedi,ate area, to the Air Base Village and Redwood
Road on the \V-est, to 9th North on the North (R. 53),
East to Second West and North Temple (R. 39) and
South to Ninth South (R. 40). He had a "tremendous
amount of deliveries" during the time of his employInent (R. 54). Mr. W. T. Geurts, one of the owners
of appellant corporation testified that he had delivered
as far East as the Sugarhouse shopping 'area; '' E''
Street, '' F '' ~treet and First A venue; South to lOth
South and \\rest Ternple and 12th South and immedi-
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ately East of Redwood Road (R. 77).
We find no affirrnative testimony stating that
either the two-mile radius or the five-year period prescribed by the employrnent contract are unreasonable
or unduly restrictive. The only item thereon is the
·bald declaration by plaintiff that he desires to compete in the area, see Request for Admission (R. 10).
He testified that he had not looked for employment
in the two-mile area and had no offers of employment
within that area and did not desire to be employed at
a drug store scheduled to be constructed in the Rose
Park area (R. 55-56).
As pharmacist and manager he had full access
to the 6980 prescriptions of appellant's customers and
felt at liberty to use or disclose these to others (R.
55), likewise as to the narcotics and· poison list (R.
57), trade markups, bookkeeping, customers' names
and similar confidential information.

STATEl\fENT OF

P~OINTS

I.
THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT WAS FAIR AND
REASONABLE.

II.
THE RESTRICTIVE
ABLE AND FAIR.

COVENANTS WERE REASON-

III.
THERE· WAS MUTUALITY IN THE CONVENANTS IN
THE CONTRACT.
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IV.
rHE CONTRACT \VAS SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE
tJONSIDERATION.

v.
THE CONTRACT RESTRICTIONS ARE NOT CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY AND SHOULD BE ENFORCED.

VI.
THE RESPONDENT ACCEPTED BENEFITS OF THE
CONTRACT AND IS ESTOPPED FROM ATTACKING
RESTRICTIONS.

ARGUMENT

I.
THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT WAS FAIR AND
REASONABLE.

II.
THE RESTRICTIVE
ABLE AND FAIR.

COVENANTS WERE REASON-

This was a negotiated contract of employment
reached after the customary arms length dealing.
nir. \v. .illiam T. Geurts testified that they had discussed
the employment first about Oct. 25, 1949 and presented
the contract to respondent about a week to ten days
later (R. 73) and respondent retained it for about a
week before signing it (R. 73). Respondent emphatically stated on rebuttal, direct testimony that he had
insisted upon an interest in the business, ''Those were
1ny ter1ns when I negotiated the contract." (R. 92).
To roughly analyze the Contract of Employment
(Exhibit "B") we find the following terms: in the
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prearnble respondent "upon the following terms !and
conditions'' accepts the employrnent and agrees to
perform. The first three paragraphs detail the employing and the duties. rrhe next paragraph outlines his
compensation of so much per week plus a bonus of
ten per cent of the net profits which are computed
in pursuance of the formula recited in paragraph five
and by paragraph six to be accumulated for purchase
of stock in appellant up to 25o/o ownership interest.
Paragraph seven states that it is a continuing contract of employment requiring him to give 60 days
notice and the appellant to give 30 days notice of intention to quit or discharge or five days notice in case
of his breach of the contract. Paragraph eight is the
one in controversy and requires him to account for
all funds in the event of termination ''for any reason''
and that "he shall not directly or indirectly compete
as an employee or principal, in the operation of a
drug store or pharmacy within a radius of two miles
of this drug store for a period of five years thereafter.''
Breach would entitle appellant to injunctive relief.
The last paragraph provided for costs and attorneys
fees to enforce the contract.
Plaintiff does not claim that he did not read or
understand the contract. He admits that he has received the benefits, including compensation for 30 days
after his discharge in lieu of 30 days notice. He does
not tender back this benefit hut only asks relief from
his lack of foresight, as he puts it, in agreeing not to
compete. The District Court f.ound that the parties

10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dealt in good faith (R. 93).
The la\Y relative to these restrictive covenants has
undergone a change in the past one hundred years.
There has been an abrupt and firn1 reversal of the old
English rule that such agreements \Yere against public
policy and hence unenforceable. The law not only
ha~ been relaxed but now in the United States is
clear that so long as the restraint in length of time
and area of space is reasonable, the negative agreement not to compete is valid and enforceable, See:
17 C.J.S. 626 Par. 243 Contracts; Williston on Contracts, (Rev. Ed.) \~ ol. V, p. 4578, Sect. 1635.
The burden of proof now is upon the contracting
party, \Yho seeks to escape from his agreement, to
sho"'" that the negatiYe covenant is unduly restrictive
or oppressive. Your Court has recently gone over this
subject matter and rendered a decision in Case No.
7350, The Valley ~Iortuary vs. Lionel Fairbanks, 225
Pac. ( 2d) 739, ______ U t. ------·
By contract in 1945 the defendant agreed that for
twenty-five years he \vould not operate a mortuary or
funeral business in Provo, south of Provo in Utah
County or in Juab County. This action was started
in 1948 to enjoin future violations and for damages.
The lo\Yer Court awarded damages and ·an injunction
against future violations. The defendant then appeale<l
and your Court, after an extensive review of the facts
and law, sustained the injunction but remanded the
case to the lovver court only for additional evidence on
the damages suffered.

11
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Though this case involved the sale of a business
and impliedly the good will thereof, still your Court
felt no problem as to the area or time stated in the
restrictive covenant. The interdicted area of Provo
City, all of Utah County south thereof and all of Juab
County was broader than the bounds of that defendant's former area of operation and such was specified
''in· the agreement to exclude competition by the defendant in a more wide-spread area than would have
been excluded by the sale of the good will without
the addition of the restrictive clause.''
In short, the broad area and the 25-year period
were held by your Court to be reasonable and the injunctive relief granted was affirmed on the appeal.
Comparing this with the two-mile radius and the fiveyear period now before this Court, we feel that no
hesitancy should exist in sustaining this modest time
and ·area restriction.
The contract in our present case (Exhibit "B")
reveals that this is more than an ordinary employeremployee relationship which has been created. A new
pharmacy and drug store was being opened with the
defendant's money risked in ·an area having no such
facilities nearby. Plaintiff w'as to act not only as a
pharmacist but also as manager and in addition, he
was to acquire a proprietary interest in the business
itself through a stock-bonus pTogram. This gave him
an interest in the good will and development of the
business itself. l-Ie was in a position of direct, personal
eontact with the custon1ers as manager and in his

12
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profe88ional eapaeity a8 a pharn1acist.
There i8 nothing ag·ain8t public policy to i1npose
rea8onable re8trietion8 upon ·an en1ployee in such a
key po8ition a8 he is in a position to take from the
en1ployer part of the good \Yill if he departs from his
employn1ent and 8et8 up in competition. The trade
seeret:5 of defendant's pharmacy in the form of pharnlaceutical prescriptions, narcotic records, etc., names
of custoiners, Inethods of buying, credit program, markups, trade preferences, and general policy were all
aYailable to the plaintiff and in danger of being passed
on to competitors in the trade ·area or used by the
plaintiff in the area to compete \Yith defendant. This
man \vas not a mere "'soda jerk" or clerk.
\V e should like to refer you to 17 C.J ..S. 254, p. 636.
\\-e have reviewed the decisions cited thereunder.
Though there are several in which the restrictions
have been held invalid, such in the main are instances
where unlimited restrictions have been imposed or
the employee is -an ordinary S!alesman. Let us cite a
fe'' of the majority and distinctly typical decisions
wherein the employee's negative covenant has been
held valid:
Agreements not to engage in a competing business
\vill ordinarily be held valid where necessary to protect the employer against employee's use of trade
secrets confided to him during employment. N.J.-Bond
Electric Corporation v. Keller, 166 A. 341, 113 N.J.
Eq. 195. Ideal Laundry Co. v. Gugliemone, 151 A. 617,
107 N.J. Eq. 108. N.Y.-Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers
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Film Products, 179 N.Y.S. 325, 189 App. Div. 556,
reversing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Warren, 178 N.Y.S.
14, 108 Misc. 680. Davey Tree Expert Co. v. Black,
244 N.Y.S. 239, 137 Misc. 702. Stoneman v. Wilson,
192 S.E. 81'6.
Prohibiting employee froin engaging in undertaking business in city or vicinity for ten years. Chandler, Gardner, & Williams v. Reynolds, 145 N.E. 476,
250 Mass. 309.
Prohibiting general manager of optical company
from entering into competing business for five years
anywhere in the United States west of Detroit, Mich.Wahlgren v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., C.C.A. Ill.,
68 F.2d 660, affirming D.C., Bausch & Lomb Optical
Co. v. Wahlgren, 1 F. Supp. 799, and Certiorari denied
Wahlgren v. Bausch & Lomb Optieal Co., 54 .S.Ct.
774, 292 U.S. 639, 78 L.Ed. 1491, rehearing denied 54
S.Ct. 862, 272 U.S. 615, 78 L.Ed. 1491.
''If an employer is engaged in a business which
he carried on through agents or servants whose performance of their duties involves a confidential knowledge of the employer's trade or business and brings
them into such direct and personal business relation
with the employer's business and its p~atrons that
the agents or servants commonly acquire the names
and residence of customers, their requirements, credit
and other trade or business information, or a personal
following or clientele during the period of their service, then it is not injurious to the public, and it is
reasonable to permit the employer and the agent or
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~erYant

to enter into an ancill,ary covenant in partial
restraint of trade to protect the e1nployer 's business
fron1 the con1petition of the servant for a reasonable
length of ti1ne throughout a definite area." Tolman
Laundry Co. v. \r alker, 187 ...-\.. 836, 838, 171 Md. 7.
...\gree1nent relating to restraint on connection with
business in county only covered such employment _as
'vould enable diversion of trade to subsequent employer.
-Durbro\Y Conunission Co. Y. Donner, 229 N.W. 635,
201 ""'"is. 175.
Requiring general n1anager of loan and investment
company, not to engage in same business in same city
for one year following termination of employment.Eigelbach v. Boone Loan & Investment Co., 287 S.W.
225, 216 Ky. 69.
Binding clothing store manager not to enter competing business for period of t\YO years within stated
territory.-l\Ioskin Bros. v. Swartzberg, 155 .S.E. 154,
199 N.C. 539.
Requiring head salesman not to engage in business
of selling products similar to those sold by employer
in certain territory, for eighteen months.-Grand Union
Tea Co. v. Walker, 195 N.E. 277, 208 Ind. 245, 98
A.L.R. 958.
Restricting employees of industrial engineering
firm for two years from entering into the employ of
clients of employer. May v. Young, 2 A.2d 385, 125
Conn. 1, 119 A.L.R. 1445.
Restraining employee from engaging in competitive
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advertising business in ·any city o1· state in which he
worked for two years. Thomas W. Briggs Co. v.
Mas·on, 289 S.W. 295, 217 I<::y. 269, 52 A.L.R., 1344.
Requiring physician's employee, given access to
the acquaintance and confidence of patients, not to
enter into competition with physician for three years
after termination of relationship. Granger v. Cr~aven,
199 N.W. 10, 159 Minn. 296, 52 A.L.R. 1356.
Prohibiting employee of tree co1npany for year,
from engaging in tree surgery within the radius of
one hundred miles of city in which company maintained office. Davey Tree Expert Co. v. Ackelbein, 25
S. W. 2d 62, 233 Ky. 115.
, Let us keep in mind that the employer is not here
suing out an injunction, but the employee, separ:ated
from his position in accord with the contr~act, now seeks
to have this Court, by declaratory judgment, say that
one phrase of his agreement, solemnly executed by
him as a condition precedent to procuring his position,
is invalid and unenforceable. The burden is on the
plaintiff herein. The contract gave him the right to
quit at ~any time after notice to defendant. He is in
no different position now than if he'd exercised his
right to terminate his employment so as to go into
competition.
The most recent case in our neighboring state of
Wyoming is Ridley v. Krout, 180 P .. (2d) 124, (page 8).
Therein the employment contract was for keymaking,
bicycle repairs, etc. at Sheridan, Wyo. The neg,ative
covenant covered 17 years and encompassed Sheridan
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County, J ohn~on l'iounty and Ca1npbell County, all in
\\"yoming. The en1ploype departed fro1n his service
and e1nployer ~ought an injunction. The Wyon1ing
Court denied the injunction, basing the same in part
on the grounds that he \Yas a g·eneral repairm·an and
did not po~~e~~ any trade secrets and that it was
ag·ainst public policy to require the people of the st·ate
100 1nile~ a\Yay in one of the restricted counties to
travel such distances to procure repair of their bicycles, la\YnnlO\\. ers, etc. at Sheridan. (p. 133).
The instant case holds no such public disadvantage.
By defendant's undenied answer it is shown that the
plaintiff is no\Y engaged as a pharmacist in Salt Lake
City and hence, through use of telephone and delivery
service, the public may procure his services and he
may carry on his profession. He was working for
vv:algrens before the contract with appellant and now
is so employed. However, appellant does not want
him competing in the store's immediate neighborhood.
He now seeks the court's approbation for competing
in wilful violation of his covenant not to do so. There
are many other drug stores available to the public,
not only in the two-mile radius, but also many more
in Salt Lake City proper. No unlawful restl'1aint of
trade can be claimed herein.
An understanding of the fact that this contract was
executed prior to the opening of defendant's .pharmacy
and that palintiff was afforded the opportunity of
acquisition of ownership interest, differentiates this
fro1n any case cited in the general collection of authori-
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ties in C.J.S. The parties here dealt at arms length
and after rna ture consideration executed the restrictive covenant. This is not oppressive and imposes no
undue hardship on the plaintiff, as is evidenced by
his ready procurement of employment as a pharmacist
just outside of the two-mile radial area at W algrens.
In 9 A.L.R. 1467 is an annotation which purports
to outline the reasons for sustaniing or breaking these
negative covenants. We quote in part
"The validity of covenants by employees not
to engage in a similar or competing husin~ss for
a definite period of time, following the termination of the contract of employment in which the
covenant is incorporated, may be sustained, although the contract is recognized to be in rest~aint of trade. The test generally applied in
determining the validity of such a covenant is
whether or not the restraint is necessary for
the' protection of the business or good will of
the employer, and, if so, whether it imposes on
the employee any greater restraint than is reasonably necessary to secure to the business of
the employer, or the good will thereof, such protection, regard being had to the injury which
may result to the public, by restraining the
breach of the covenant, in the loss of the service and skill of the employee, and the danger of
his coming a charge upon the public."
We have referred briefly to the reasonableness of
the two-mjle radial area. Let us now turn to the
time of five years for consideration. In the Valley
Mortuary ca.se the Utah Sup. Ct. did not consider the
twenty-five year period excessive and the covenant was
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~u~tained.

The nu1 p \Yhich plaintiff has presented for
ad1nis~ion of facts sho"·s that the pharmacy at issue
is in the extreine Northwest portion of the populated
area of Salt Lake City. The time period prescribed is
reasonable to allo''T for the develop1nent of subdivisions
and other population expansion in the vicinity pioneered by defendant and served through delivel'y service from the pharmacy.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff herein to
sho'Y any unreasonableness of restraint or any 1adverse
affect on the public.· If any invalidity arises it is only
where the covenant offends public policy and not just
if it limits one individual. We submit that the ap.pellant, having had the fortitude to open up a pharmacy
in the extreme Northwest portion of the city to serve
the gro\Ying population there, should be entitled to
protection fron1 a former employee's comp.etition in
violation of his covenants. The defendant's foresight
and care in protecting itself from just what plaintiff
now seeks to do should be rewarded rather than be
punished.

III.
THERE WAS MUTUALITY IN THE COVENANTS IN
THE CONTRACT.

IV.
THE CONTRACT WAS SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE
CONSIDERATION.

The matter of mutuality and the adequacy of the
e1nployrnent contract can well be considered together.
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Though each such element may be raised in relation to a
contract we assert that in this instance both were present.
On the part of respondent, the employee, h~__ agreed
to perform services as pharmacist and manager, to
give 60 days notice of intention to quit, to account for
all funds and in the event of termination for any real:-;On, not to compete for five years in a two-mile area.
On the part of the appellant, Rose Park Pharmacy,
it agreed to employ him as pharmacist and manager,
to pay him a stipulated weekly wage, to pay him a
bonus from net profits, to permit him to. acquire up to
25% of its stock, to give him 30 days prior notice of
intention to discharge him. As an implied obligation,
the Pharmacy had to maintain a building in which
to operate the business, stock the store, provide employees to assist him, provide finances and payroll for
the drug store's operation.
Let us first consider whether there exists that
.· mutuality of obligation or remedy which may support
this enforceable agreement not to compete. It is
fundamental that such mutuality is never absent if a
consideration moves from both parties. 17 C.J.S. 445.
The present agreement is a bilateral contract, executed
by both parties cont aining promises and obligations,
one from another.
1

An early Utah case considered this matter, Abba
v. .Smyth, 21 U t. 109, 59 Pac. 75'6. Therein plaintiff
was employed by defendant to farm certain acreage in
Weber County upon a share crop hasis for the f~arming
20
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~ea~on~ l~~)S,

1899 and 1900. Defendant "ras to provide
the farrn, ~Ped~, in1plernents, board and lodging and
a helper. In .~..-\.pril plaintiff started \vork, but in N ovember of the first .Year defendant ordered hirn
from the
.
farrn and preYented hirn from con1pleting the season~.
Plaintiff ~ned for hi~ darnages sustained by breach of
the contract. One defense raised was the lack of
mutuality as to rernedy. The Court stated:
""The rule in Yoked by the respondent that
\vhen only one of the parties signs the contract,
such party only becomes hound thereby, does
not apply here, as both parties signed the contract, and it \vas mutually binding upon both.
By signing the contract both become obligated
by its terms and consented to its provisions,
and should be held bound by such reasonable
construction as the contract implies. The agreement \vas not unilateral, but bound both parties
to it. It was not void under the statute of
frauds, as both parties executed the writing
which imposed mutual obligations on each.
But it is claimed that the testimony was inadmissible, and was rejecte·d on the ground that it
\vas irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent;
that it \vas unilateral and only bound the defendant; that it lacked mutuality, and was therefore void under the statute of frauds.
As already stated, we do not concur in this
view."
Citations supporting generally this rule of your
Court may be found in 17 C.J.S. 443-6. Likewise it
is well established that the mutuality may even be
irnplied, see 17 C.J.S. 448.
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In actuality, these employ1nent contracts stand in
a ·different ·area of approach than many types of agreeInent. · The promise on each side is of a different
character as one provides the skill and manpower
and th~ other the . facilities, rna terials and salary. It
is true that ~·.. contract: bearing a negative covenant
~~st be supporte~ ."Qy valuable consideration which
appears on the face of the agreement. However, the
adequacy of such consideration cannot be inquired
into by the yourts. .See: 17 C.J.S. 641; Griffin v. Guy
(Md.), 192 A. 359; ~and Danner v. Hoffman (Pa.) 26
Pa. Dist. 636. The earlier rule was that the restraint
must be supported by a consideration equivalent in
value to the restraint imposed. This doctrine has been
repudiated. 13- C.J. 488.
Discussing contract principles recently, your Court
1n Van Tassell v. L·ewis, ______ Utah ______ , 222 Pac. (2d)
350 correctly st,ated that the words, "in consideration
of'' have· a technical meaning in contract law denoting
that which supports or gives validity to the contract;
that which supports the meeting of the minds. (p. 353).
Exhibit "B" in our present litigation, after the introductory paragraph reads, ''In consideration of the
·coveuants ·herein contained the Pharmacy hereby employs Osborne (respondent) upon the following terms
and conditions and Osborne accepts such employment
. and agrees to ·perform the services sp-ecified.''

v.
THE CONTRACT RESTRICTIONS ARE NOT CONTRARY· TO: PUBLIC POLICY AND SHOULD BE ENFORCED.
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VI.
THE RESPONDENT ACCEPTED BENEFITS OF THE
CONTRACT AND IS ESTOPPED FROM ATTACKING
RESTRICTIONS.

In no portion of the reeord is there a single item of
evidence \Yhich \Yould iinport that the public could in any
manner suffer from lack of respondent's services within the prohibited t'vo-Inile area. Other drug stores
are aYailable both \vithin and \vithout the said territory. ...\ppellant is still operating· its pharmacy and
serving the entire area. Respondent is employed
again at ''Talgrens and is not in danger of becoming
a charge of the community because of being restricted
from the area. He has not sought a job within the
area and testified that he has no offers of employment within the s'ame.
Respondent has taken and retained all of the
benefits and advantages of the contract, including 30
days pay after his employment had been terminated, but
seeks to renege on this one obligation not to compete
in the limited area. His evident desire for equitabl~
relief from his solemn covenant should be accompanied
by some tender on his own part to do equity, but no
such offer has ever been made.
Appellant respectfully submits that it entered into
the agreement \Yith respondent in good faith, after
negotiations and study, and that it has faithfully performed its duties, agreements and obligations recited
by the e111ployment contract. The trial court erred in
1
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holding that this restrictive paragraph of the contra~t
was unenforceable.
We sub1nit that the judgment of the lower court
should be reversed and the 'appellant awarded its costs
herein.
Respectfully submitted,
PUGSLEY, HAYE.S &

RAMPT~ON,

721 Cont'l Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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HARRY
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